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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAHf
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v*
Case No. 920853-CA
Priority No, 2

COREY LYNN BROOKS,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992 Supp.) provides
this Court's jurisdiction over this case transferred from the Utah
Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Does the record of the jury selection demonstrate that a
new trial is necessary?
2. Do Mr. Brooks' convictions for burglary and robbery
illegally punish him twice for one crime?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The jury selection issue involves this Court's
determination of whether the trial court abused his discretion in
conducting an inadequate voir dire of the potential jurors, and/or
whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to
request an adequate voir dire, in using a peremptory challenge to
remove a presumptively prejudiced juror, and in allowing tainted

panelists to serve on Mr. Brooks' jury.

See State v. Ellifritz, 835

P.2d 170, 175-178 (Utah App. 1992).
The sentencing issue involves the "abuse of discretion"
standard, which encompasses whether the trial court "fail[ed] to
consider all legally relevant factors" and whether the sentence is
"clearly excessive."

State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah

1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix 1 of this brief contains the full text of the
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
United States Constitution Amendment XIV section 1
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-402
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 46
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Mr. Brooks with one count of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-302; with one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree
felony violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203; and with one
count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a
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second degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503
(R. 6-8). 1

Mr. Brooks waived his preliminary hearing, and the

magistrate bound him over as charged (R. 2-3). The first trial of
this case was defended by James A. Valdez in October of 1991, and
ended in a mistrial as a result of a hung jury (R. 32-37).

On

December 31, 1991, Nick H. Porterfield entered an appearance of
counsel for Mr. Brooks (R. 76). A jury convicted Mr. Brooks of the
first two counts on March 27, 1992 (R. 203-204).

The trial court

subsequently found Mr. Brooks guilty of the third count (T2 610),
and sentenced Mr. Brooks to two terms of five years to life and one
one to fifteen year term, to run concurrently with each other and
consecutively to his time from a previous conviction, and
consecutively to a zero to five year gun enhancement term (R.
210-213).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Martha Vert and her two daughters, Tiffany, 16, and
Stephanie, 23, were at home on January 28, 1991, when a young man
came to their home to examine a diamond ring that Stephanie was
selling.

He had apparently read Stephanie's ad in the paper, called

the Vert residence to set up an appointment, and then arrived as
scheduled.

He carried a large walkie talkie with him, and spent

1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to as
R. The transcript of the second trial will be referred to as T2,
with page references to the court reporters' pagination, rather than
to the record stamp.
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about 30 to 45 minutes in the Vert home visiting and making
arrangements to come with his father to the Vert home the next
morning, when his father would pay for the ring. T2 102-108, 203-208.
The next morning around 9:00, the young man came to the
Vert residence, and was wearing a hat, sunglasses and gloves and
carrying the walkie talkie he had the night before.
the only person home when he arrived.

Stephanie was

After he entered the home and

she began making coffee, he pulled a gun on Stephanie, handcuffed
her to the plumbing in the basement bathroom, and gathered various
items of jewelry worth approximately $5,500 from the Vert
residence.

Stephanie heard him say into the walkie talkie that he

would be out in three seconds, and heard him leave the house.
unscrewed the plumbing and reached her mother on the phone.

She

The

police were called and an investigation ensued. T2 108-117, 122,
210-219.
Martha, Tiffany and Stephanie Vert identified Mr. Brooks as
the young man who came to their home, and Stephanie testified that
it was Mr. Brooks who returned to their home and robbed her. T2
105-108, 139-143, 159-160, 206, 211-212, 219.
The remainder of the evidence presented at the two trials
concerns whether or not the Verts were correct in identifying Mr.
Brooks as the young man who came to their home and as the robber,
and concerns events after the robbery, and is not necessary to the
issues to be resolved by this Court.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury voir dire demonstrates that one panelist was
incompetent, but served on Mr. Brooks' jury.

The panelist revealed

during voir dire that his wife's physical therapy and his
responsibilities to his wife would impair his ability to pay
attention to the trial.

The trial court conducted an inadequate

voir dire to rebut the inference of bias attaching to three
panelists who had suffered crimes similar to those at issue for the
jury's assessment.

Trial counsel did not request additional voir

dire or challenge the panelists for cause.

Trial counsel removed

one of the similar-crimes panelists with a peremptory challenge, and
the other two panelists served on Mr. Brooks' jury.

This record

demonstrates that Mr. Brooks should be given a new trial wherein the
jury is selected properly.
Mr. Brooks should not have been convicted of burglary and
robbery because Utah statutory and state and federal constitutional
law prohibit punishing Mr. Brooks twice for one crime.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE INADEQUACY OF THE JURY SELECTION
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE JURY SELECTION PROCEEDINGS.
The state and federal constitutions require trial courts to
insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire proceedings.
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn.1-6 (Utah 1988)(citing
Article I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the
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Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution).
The Utah Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power
to reiterate to the trial courts of this state that it is their
responsibility to insure that voir dire proceedings not only provide
adequate information for the informed exercise of peremptory
challenges, but also eliminate bias and prejudice from criminal
trials.

State v. Jamesf 819 P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991).

In

James, the court directed the trial courts to go beyond the
minimally adequate voir dire required by federal constitutional
standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror biases to the best
of their ability,

rd.

Utah's allegiance to the need for thorough

voir dire in criminal cases has been strong and consistent.

State

v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-845 (Utah 1988); State v. Ballf 685
P.2d 1055, 1058-1061 (Utah 1984).
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the right to
an impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 (e)(14)
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings that are
adequate to reveal juror biases.

The rule provides that a juror

should be removed for cause if the voir dire indicates "that a state
of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause,
or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party
challenging[. ]lf
In addition to proscribing the service of panelists who
suffer from bias relevant to the case to be tried, the rule requires
the court to conduct an adequate voir dire to identify panelists who
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are not competent to serve because of "any mental or physical
infirmity."

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(2).

This rule is

consistent with the constitutional rights to a mentally competent
jury.

See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987).

See

also State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984)(juror competency
is separate issue from juror impartiality).
"Trial courts are responsible for safeguarding a
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury."
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

Trial courts are

also responsible to determine whether prospective jurors are legally
competent to serve.

Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8.

B. THE JURY SELECTION IN THIS CASE WAS INADEQUATE.
1. Juror Barber was incompetent.
The trial court asked the jurors, "Are there any of you who
have any pressing or urgent business or personal matters over the
next four days that would prevent you from providing satisfactory
jury service of the next four days?" (T2 29). Panelist Frank L.
Barber was one of two jurors to respond to this question.

In

response to the court's question as to his ability to provide
satisfactory jury service, Mr. Barber indicated under oath, "Since I
qualified for the jury list my wife has had knee surgery and I'm
required to take her for therapy three times a week, Monday,
Wednesdays and Fridays at 5:00 o'clock in Sandy."

The court asked

if other arrangements could be made to get his wife to therapy, and
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Mr. Barber indicated, "I have been unable to so far."

The court

asked if Mr. Barber was trying to make other arrangements.
Barber indicated, "Well, she has until —

Mr.

a week from today she goes

in to the doctor to see if the therapy has been successful."
court indicated, "I understand.

The

But the question was: Is there any

other possibility to work out other arrangements?"

Mr. Barber

responded, "I don't have anyone I could trust with her."

The court

asked Mr. Barber if he had checked to see if the therapy could be
rescheduled, and Mr. Barber indicated that he had not.
then stated, "Ordinarily, we are in recess.

The court

So, if you are

selected, the Court would appreciate having you see if that —

the

time could be changed; and we'd recess in time enough to allow you
to do that.
serve?"

Given that accommodation, do you feel that could you

Mr. Barber answered, "I am not sure that I could devote my

undivided attention to the case under the circumstances."

(T2

29-31).
Mr. Barber was not rehabilitated with further questioning,
challenged for cause or removed with a peremptory challenge.

He

served on Mr. Brooks' jury.
In contrast, the other juror who responded to the court's
question about being able to provide satisfactory jury service, Gary
Pickering, indicated that as a matter of conscience stemming from
his interpretation of his religion, he could not serve on a jury (T2
25, 31). The trial court removed Mr. Pickering for cause, despite
the fact that Mr. Pickering was so far down the jury list that he
would not have served in any event (T2 85; R. 152).
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Just as the triri'l court removed panelist Pickering, the
c

,

il i inn "if ,11 | iiiiieJI ist.

B a r b e r , w h o , due Lu his wile's

condition and h i s responsibility to h i s w i f e , revealed that he was
too preoccupied to serve in this case.
sen ••

il In I i HI I

I, I I IMI in I

M r . Barber's inabil it >» t >

jndered him incompetent to serve.

The United States Supreme Court "has recognized that a
defendant has r« >-• «•"
c Dmpe tei i 1:
107,

tribunal both impartial and menta
nearinc

banner v. United S t a t e s , -

126 (1987)(citation o m i t t e d ) .

S.

In Tanner, the Court affirmed

the lower c o u r t s ' judgment that under the Federal
concerning juror drug
inadmissible to impeach the verdict.

iilf-'iiro

ring deliberations were
Id.

109-12

After

reviewing the policy reasons I in b/..-

Il i n j i y

d e l i b e r a t i o n s , the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to
competent jury w a s adequately protected by other procedural
remedies.

The first sue

-ocedu*

•- I

tl ICII S ii : ::: t::l i

Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury mentioned by the Court
w a s jury v o i r d i r e .
this cast

Id.

T K * failure of the trial court

remove

mentally competent jury.

T H > i I • 11 • 1 I Ii

H i ,M ,iI,>.r

See id.

Numerous Utah statutes and rules recognize that when jurors
are unable to engage 1 Mr l i I nin ii I I' i P«I V i I Ii I li
presented, they are not competent to ser v e.

'I.I« v I l\ -i I i s I, c-? i. JIU
Ill ider Utah law, it is

the duty of the trial court to assess juror competency.
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U t a h Code

(1) The court, on its own initiative or when
requested by a prospective juror, shall determine
whether the prospective juror is disqualified
from jury service. The court shall base its
decision on the information provided on the juror
qualification form, or by interview with the
prospective juror or other competent evidence.
The clerk shall enter the court's determination
on the juror qualification form and on the
alphabetical list of names drawn from the master
jury wheel.
Subsection (2)(c) indicates that the following describes an
incompetent juror:
(c) a person who is not capable because of
physical or mental disability of rendering
satisfactory jury service.
This subsection further grants the court the power to require proof
of the disability from a physician.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(1) indicates that a
challenge for cause lies if a juror is legally unqualified to
serve.

Subsection (e)(2) indicates that a challenge for cause

should be granted if a prospective juror suffers from "any physical
or mental infirmity" compromising his ability to serve.

Utah Rule

of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) indicates, in part, that a challenge
for cause lies if "a state of mind exists on the part of the juror
with reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging."

(Emphasis added).

Because Mr.

Barber was unable to pay attention, his service was prejudicial to
Mr. Brooks' rights to a fair trial, and to the unanimous verdict of
eight competent jurors.

The service of Mr. Barber on Mr. Brooks'

jury thus violated not only his federal rights to a competent jury,
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but also numerous Utah statutes designed to protect that right.
Several cases from other jurisdictions demonstrate that
whej

physically

A

aentally unaoie to listen

to the evidence, that juror is not competent to serve

should be

See Neal v, State, A hi) So. 2d

removed for cause.
(

court d id not abust; ::i ts ciiscretior

striking two panelists, one of whom could not concentrate because
his child would be left home unattended, and one
physically unable to attend the long trial ); Hernandez v. State, 643
S.W.2d 397, 401-402 (Tex. Cr.App. 1983)(trial court did not abuse
its discretion ::i in: i removing
juror w h o w a s incompetent to serve dij a result of physical and
mental d e f e c t s ) ; Goodwin v. State, 799 S W .2 it 7] 9, 736-737

for cause of juror whi, indicated that she would probably not give
full attention to the tri al , and w a s physically impaired by her
pregnancy l

i"ii I

denie^

State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.

^llarreal v.
1979)(trial court did not abuse

its discretion by granting prosecution's challenge for cause of
p a n e l ns t

i I'll

i iiiii :::I ::i • :

would prevent h e r service); State v. Jett, 805 P.2d 78, E2 (N.M.
1991)(juror w h o does not understand English well enough to assess
Lite

i , nil- nil i

in

IIIII

Il ni {mi in Il mi III IIIII i III II

ni i I ; Mahan v . Farmers u n i o n

Central Exchange, 768 P.2d 850, 855 (Mont. 1989)(court should remove
juror w h o appears to have difficulty speaking and h e a r i n g ) ; State v.
Miliex

^hough

. . ,

competence is a matter for judicial determination, a juror's
specific statement of such a factual matter, that is, what he or she
could or could not hear, should control over a judge's opinion
regarding the juror's ability to hearing in the absence of some
indication of insincerity or falsehood on the part of the juror.");
State v. Galleqos, 542 P.2d 832 (N.M. 1975)(it would violate state
constitutional law requiring unanimous jury verdict in criminal case
for criminal conviction to stand when one of the jurors could not
understand English well enough to understand the issues and exercise
his independent judgment); Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 423-425
(Miss.)(trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing jurors
who were sleeping, on medication, and incoherent and contradictory
during voir dire), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); Commonwealth
v. Gibbons, 549 A.2d 1296, 1302-1303 (Pa.Super. 1988)(trial court
did not abuse its discretion in removing panelist who said that she
was too nervous to serve on the jury).
As a result of Mr. Barber's wife's physical disability, and
his resultant inability to pay full attention to this case, he was
not competent to serve as a constitutionally adequate juror.

In

allowing Mr. Barber to serve on Mr. Brooks' jury when Mr. Barber was
not competent to do so, the trial court violated the court's
statutory duty to insure the legal qualification of the jurors.
Given the constitutional rights at stake in a criminal trial, and
the ease of dismissing Mr. Barber and using another panelist, the
trial court abused his discretion in allowing Mr. Barber to serve as
one of the eight jurors in this case.
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2. The voir dire was inadeguate to rebut the inference of bias
attaching to three prospective jurors who had experienced burglaries
and/or robberies,
A review of the voir dire transcript reflects that
panelists Pike and Heap

panei

Jeurts

was removed with Mr. Brooks' first peremptory challenge (
151-152).

The record reflects that these three panelists had all

experienced

)

1 ! i:)iie of the three

jurors was challenged for cause or asked one question concerning how
their prior victimization would influence their performance ir tii is
case

examined

concerning how their prior victimization of robberies
would influence their performance, and that
for cause

nambers
burglaries

of them was removed
jurfered robberies

and/or burglaries were also left unexamined concerning how these
experiences would influence their performance, and wer

amoved

. . I , .*. . at It did
not appear that they would serve (T2 68-8'

L51-152).

This case was tried after the publicat inn nl' Statu v,
Woolle
1991)

ml

denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah

which this Court held that when panelists have been

victims of the crimes similar " those to INI it jetl

in i iif i >i t?in i

i

, requiring the trial court to probe
the jurors in further voir dire until the inference of bias
rebutted.
federal constitutional law governing this issue is
discussed

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 166 (1965).
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There, the

Court reversed a state court decision affirming a conviction and
death sentence.

There, the jurors were constantly escorted by

members of the sheriff's office, including two officers who
testified against the defendant.

The state court disapproved of the

proceedings in the trial court, but held that no reversible error
had occurred because the defendant had shown no evidentiary
prejudice.

Id. at 466-471.

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding

that the trial court proceedings violated due process, as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 471.

The Court stated,

In essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial
by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing
violates even the minimal standards of due
process. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.' In the
ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man
of his liberty or his life. In the language of
Lord Coke, a juror must be 'indifferent as he
stands unsworne.' His verdict must be based upon
the evidence developed at the trial. This is
true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime
charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or
the station of life which he occupies. ...
The requirement that a jury's verdict "must
be based upon the evidence developed at the
trial" goes to the fundamental integrity of all
that is embraced in the constitutional concept of
a trial by jury. "The jury is an essential
instrumentality — an appendage — of the court,
the body ordained to pass upon guilt or
innocence. Exercise of calm and informed
judgment by its members is essential to proper
enforcement of law. . . .
Id. at 471-472 (citations omitted).
In recognition of the fundamental nature of the right to a
fair and impartial jury, Utah Courts have required trial courts to
conduct adequate inquiries into juror biases during jury selection

-14-

1r T

* * ~1"1 ->f the jurors who had experienced

proceedings,

the crimes at issue in the instant case should have been removed
cause,

examined carefully inn i II I lhi

i in t i cure

from the jurors' experiences was rebutted.

r

r

il in as arising

See State v. Woolley f

810 P.2d 440, 442-448 (Utah App.)(inference of bias arising from
juror's prior victi iii za I:::i ::: i i ::: f same c i: i m = ci 1: i ssue in case was not
sufficiently rebutted), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 85] (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) ;
State v. Cobb y 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989)(juror acquaintance
with proseciil m , i III! I'll prciliocl d i n in \

i i Hi i

itJ u o l r a i s e

inference of bias requiring rebuttal); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d
(Utah App, 1992)(trial court failed to remove juror
examine her in »M,enii»'in " ' inferen :"»; 'i,l bias, stemming from her
relationships with the prosecutor and police was r e b u t t e d ) ; State v.
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 765-768 (Utah 1980)(trial
removed

exam

j _ n e d them until the inference of

bias arising from their partiality toward police officers was
rebutted).
r

,

.abused hiu discretion . ~ ^ailing to conduct

an adequate voir dire ot remove the jurors whose experiences with
crimes similar *

those at issue here raisfirl Innri I i| i".l i JIII.,. d l * u L
See State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 47b n.l (Utah

1987)(comparing voir dire of jurors removed for cause with voir dire
of jurors removed with peremptory challenges
rebui

l a l i t y ) ; State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 765-768

(Utah 1980)(same).

The service of the jurors with prior
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victimizations, when there was no rebuttal of the inference of bias
attaching to those jurors, was reversible error.

See e.g. Woolley

at 442 ("The Utah Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that 'it
is [the trial judge's] duty to see that the constitutional right of
an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded,' and has reversed
criminal convictions based solely on the appearance that such right
may have been jeopardized.").
The use of Mr. Brooks' peremptory challenge to remove
panelist Geurts, whom should have been stricken for cause in the
absence of the rebuttal of the inference of bias, was also
reversible error.

See e.g. State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah

1980)(it is prejudicial error to require defendant to use peremptory
challenge to remove juror who should have been removed for cause);
State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-803 (Utah 1977)(same); Crawford
v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975)(same).

C. THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
Trial courts are granted broad discretion and carry a heavy
responsibility in conducting voir dire in criminal cases.

E.g.

Mu'Min v. Virginia, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 504-510 (1991); State v. James,
819 P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991).

Under the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure, trial courts are not required to use voir dire questions
requested by defense counsel in criminal cases, and defense
attorneys are not required to object to the omissions of the trial
courts.

Compare Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 18 and 20(b) with

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 46 and 47(a).

-16-

The rules of criminal procedure are consistent with the
Utah Supreme Court's exhortations
efferl I\M >

the trial courts

I, i , > I ml In I I

stake in criminal cases.

institutional rights at

E.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-798

(Utah 1991); State . Bishop, 753 P.2d
-

"ates Supreme Court has also recognized that

there may be cases wherein jurors are so obviously and prejudicially
unqualified to serve that trial courts have i , • ii :t I
sua sponte,

:i : \

x=

Frazier v. United States, ^,> u.^* 4^/, 513

(1948) .
'I n conducting the voir dire i i i t I i = :i i : .stai it c a s e

tl \e ti :i e .]

^ court's federal constitutional duties, and
failed to follow the supervisory guidelines set forth in James
trial court did not fulfill his

The
: s

attaching to the similar-crimes panelists, as required by
Woolley.

The court also failed his statutory duty to see that the

jurors wh
so.

served

i Ih

I it < i »l :<=• , |

See .tah Code Ann. section 78-46-8.

.)
Thus,

reviewing the

totality of the questioning in this case, this Court can see that
the voir dire was inadequate
discretion.

I I

See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 4 IS.

In the alternative, the inadequate voir dire may be
attribute
for ineffective assistance ,
showing that trial counsel'

.aendmei

:

counsel normally requires a
*rformance fell below objective
Is performance was

• x /•

prejudicial.
(1984).

E.g. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696

However, in certain contexts, the prejudice prong is

presumed.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.

In circumstances involving

the violation of the right to a fair and impartial jury trial,
prejudice should be presumed.

See e.g. Presley v. State, 750 S.W.2d

602, 607 (Mo. App.)(reversing conviction on the basis of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel in jury selection; finding that
prejudice should be presumed), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988).
See also State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985)(rebuttable
presumption of prejudice attaches to jurors tainted by information
extraneous to the trial because "prejudice may well exist even
though it is not provable and even though a person who has been
tainted may not, himself, be able to recognize that fact.").
Particularly because an incompetent juror served in this case, and
Mr. Brooks was thereby denied his state constitutional right to the
unanimous verdict of eight competent jurors, the conviction should
be considered a nullity.

See Constitution of Utah, Article I

section 10; State v. Gallegos, 542 P.2d 832 (N.M. 1975)(it would
violate state constitutional law requiring unanimous jury verdict in
criminal case for criminal conviction to stand when one of the
jurors could not understand English well enough to understand the
issues and exercise his independent judgment); State v. Bates, 61 P.
905 (Utah 1900)(jury conviction rendered by eight jurors was a
nullity and without jurisdiction because it involved the ex post
facto application of the Utah Constitution where the territorial
laws in effect at the time of the murder required twelve jurors).
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Fundamental structural errors impacting on the right to a fair and
impartial jury are traditionally reversed without
ev : • * " i ,1 in i v" prejudice.
39,

(Utah App. 1993).

case.

See id.

-howinq 1

E . q. State v. Pharris,

Utah Adv. Rep.

Prejudice should be presumed in thi s

Trial counsel's conduct fell below reasonable standards of
performance.

Defense attorneys have the obligation to protect the

right to an impartial jury

t , U •.. State v. LID. Mi lie

*'" "" Ml PI

83 85 (U tal: I ] 988) (defense counsel must participate a,, , oir dire,

^

object to trial court's failure to provide adequate voir dire), See
' Hi1 hcfensp M m "I i n "

also ABA Standards for Criminal 3 ustice

Standard 4- 3 (defense attorneys are obliged to follow proper
procedures, and present appropriate motions and objections to
protect the rights i
Woolley.

Mr. Brooks was entitled to the unanimous verdict of eight

competent jurors, Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10,
I 111

III 1 I I IK I

II

I I I

I I I I ill I < III I III I

I I II I I

I I I I I I I HI I I I I I

I I I ill I II III

challenged panelist Barber for cause when it became apparent that
Mr. Barber was incompetent
Ji i priori

I

I III

II mi in ni I

supra, but did not.

serve.

ill, ,

Trial counsel should have
-t

••imiie,

Rather than using one of Mr. Brooks' peremptory

challenges to remove panelist Geurts, trial counsel should have
Lerenc
attached.

E.g. Woolley, supra.
Trial counsel's failure to challenge panelist Barber and

request

an ade

j ^ e panelists cannot be

gUate
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construed as valid tactical decisions.

The service of eight

competent jurors is a fundamental requirement to a fair trial.
Trial counsel could not make a valid strategic choice to allow the
panelists to remain on the panel or to use one of his client's
peremptory challenges until he had made a reasonable investigation
of the panelists' presumptive biases in an adequate voir dire.

E.g.

Strickland at 690-691 (strategic choices are valid only if based on
a reasonable investigation of the law and facts).

See also Broberg

v. Hessf 782 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah App. 1989)("The purposes of a jury
voir dire examination are to detect bias sufficient to challenge a
juror for cause and to collect information to permit an intelligent
use of peremptory challenges").
The shortcomings of the voir dire in this case and the
inadequacy of the jury selected should naturally undermine the
Court's confidence in the jury's verdict.

The procedural harm

resulting from the service of one incompetent juror, from the
service of two presumptively prejudiced jurors, and from the use of
a peremptory challenge to remove a presumptively prejudiced juror
who should have been challenged for cause or examined further,
cannot readily be translated into an evidence-based prejudice
analysis.

As the Court explained in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,

577-578 (1986), in discussing the application of the harmless error
doctrine, there are some constitutional violations which cannot be
addressed with an evidence-based prejudice analysis.
577-578.

Id. at

After giving examples of constitutional violations that

are not subject to harmless error analysis, the Court explained,
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W i t h o u t these basic p r o t e c t i o n s , a criminal trial
cannot reliably serve its function a s a v e h i c l e
for determination of guilt o r innocence, and no
criminal punishment m a y b e regarded a s
fundamentally fair. Harmless-error analysis t h u s
p r e s u p p o s e s a t r i a l , at which t h e d e f e n d a n t ,
represented b y c o u n s e l , m a y present evidence
argument b e f o r e an impartial judge and jury.
Id. at 577-r,7fi ,ii;„ it .it

.1

1 I

I

I

I I I) .

G i v e n t h e fundamental procedural rights violated h e r e ,
p r e j u d i c e should b e presumed.
recogr

E.g. Presley, supra.

Several > iis»i,:-i

-•* f; en s v .,1! terneys, fail to advocate their

'

c l i e n t s ' rights during jury selection, ineffective assistance of
counsel h a s occurred and requires a n e w t r i a l .
S t a t e , supra; MJI»UII V.. State,

E.g. Presley v .
1986) ; People v.

W a g n e r , 104 A.D.2d 4 5 7 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 66 (A.D.2 D e p t . 1 9 8 4 ) .
Particularly given t h e facts that M r . B r o o k s ' iKiiiii » in hided
one in nrrmipp? m m

| ill i

in i i

presumptively tainted j u r o r s , and

that o n e of M r . B r o o k s ' peremptory challenges w a s used t o remove a
juror w h o should h a v e been excused for cause in t hv iibspii i
r^btil I <i 1 »I Mi

I resumpi

i

prejudice attaching t o h e r , defense

c o u n s e l ' s d e f i c i e n t performance w a s p r e j u d i c i a l , and supports a
claim of ineffective assistance oi counse

.oolley; Bailey;

Strickland; Presley, supra.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , given t h e clear statutes and case law
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e need *j- competent iur^i c" ""|l1 ',l «Heqij ** espei, I II',

el, I H ,

i "in i«-I involving inferences of bias, the errors in this

case should be addressed by this court under the plain error
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doctrine.

See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 and nn.7-11

(Utah), cert, denied, 101 S.Ct. 62 (1989)(court should use plain
error doctrine to see that justice is done; plain error occurs when
error should have been plain to the trial court and was
prejudicial).

Juror Barber's incompetence, and the need to voir

dire all of the panelists with histories of burglary and robbery
victims should have been clear to the trial court.

The Utah code

and rules, the Utah and Federal Constitutions, and ample case law
establish that incompetent panelists cannot legally serve on a
criminal jury.

This case was tried after Woolley, wherein this

Court emphasized the trial courts' duties to insure fair trials, and
wherein this Court reiterated the need for trial courts to
investigate and/or rebut the inference of bias attaching to
panelists who have suffered the same crimes as are at issue to be
tried.
The errors were prejudicial to Mr. Brooks' case,
particularly to his fundamental procedural rights.

As the foregoing

discussion of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine
demonstrates, evidentiary prejudice should be presumed in this
instance, wherein the errors impacted on fundamental structural
procedural rights to a fair, impartial and unanimous jury.

As the

Utah Supreme Court stated long ago in reversing a capital conviction
and sentence without assessing evidentiary prejudice, in a case
wherein the defendant made a post-trial discovery that two of his
jurors had failed to reveal actual biases during voir dire,
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[I]t is never too late to do justice. . . . "
The court is constituted to enforce legal rights
and redress legal wrongs, and whenever it is made
to appear, as it is in this case, that a wrong
has been perpetrated, it never hesitates to
exercise the power which it has, unless to do so
would do a greater injury than to refuse to
exercise it.
State v. Morgan, 64 P. 356, 362 (Utah 1901)(citation omitted).

II.
MR. BROOKS' CONVICTION FOR
BURGLARY MUST BE STRICKEN.
Mr. Brooks was convicted of both aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary for the event which occurred at the Vert
residence on January 29, 1991 (R. 203-204).

The constitutional law

governing this issue is set forth in Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038
(Utah App. 1990), as follows:
[N]o person may be placed in jeopardy for the
same criminal offense more than once. U.S.
Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, §12. The
federal and state double jeopardy guarantees are
viewed as having the same content, affording
defendants three separate protections: no second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,
no second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and no multiple punishments for the
same offense.
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted).
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(2)(a) provides, "No person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense."

Utah Code

Ann. section 76-1-402 provides additional statutory protection from
multiple punishments for one crime, stating:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate offenses
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arising out of a single criminal episode;2
however, when the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under
different provisions of this code, the act shall
be punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any
such provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
The statutory term "act" is defined as "a voluntary bodily movement
and includes speech."

Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601(1).

State v.

Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah App. 1989).
The relevant "act" for purposes of the statute and double
jeopardy was the armed robbery.3

The robbery occurred after

Stephanie allowed the young man into Vert residence and began making
coffee for them.

Under the Utah Code and the facts of this case,

there was no separate act underlying the burglary conviction, which

2. "[A]11 conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective" constitutes a "single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann,
§ 76-1-401.
3. Robbery is defined as "the unlawful and intentional
taking of personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by
means of force or fear." Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301. Utah
Code Ann. section 76-6-302 defines aggravated robbery as follows:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree
felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt
to commit, during the commission of, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery.
-24-

required the unlawful remaining in the Vert residence with a gun and
the intent to commit a robbery.4

"Remaining" is not a "voluntary

bodily movement;" it is necessarily encompassed in the robbery.

On

the facts of this case, one could not have committed the robbery
without necessarily committing the burglary.
conviction should be reversed.

The burglary

See Duran, Utah Code Ann.

§76-1-601(1), supra.
While the trial counsel did not raise this issue, this
Court should nonetheless address it on the merits.

Authority for

vacating the illegal sentence underlying the burglary conviction is
provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), which states,
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in
an illegal manner, at any time."

Issues concerning the dual

punishment for one crime are considered sentencing issues.
State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990).

E.g.

The rule permits

4. "A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Utah
Code Ann. section 76-6-202.
Aggravated burglary is defined by Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-203 as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing
from a burglary the actor or another participant
in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who
is not a participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a
participant in the crime;
(c) possesses or attempts to use any
explosive or dangerous weapon.
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justice to be done regardless of whether the illegal sentence is
addressed in the trial court.

E.g. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86

(Utah), cert, denied 112 S.Ct. 883 (1992).
Alternatively, this Court should utilize the plain error
doctrine to address the merits of Mr. Brooks' illegal sentence.

The

error in convicting and sentencing Mr. Brooks for two separate first
degree felonies for one crime should have been plain to the trial
court.

Allowing Mr. Brooks to suffer a superfluous first degree

felony conviction and sentence is prejudicial.

See State v.

Eldredge, supra, discussing the plain error doctrine.
Alternatively, trial counsel's failure to raise this issue
was objectively deficient and prejudicial.

Mr. Brooks should not be

punished for his attorney's failure to raise this sentencing issue,
and this Court may reach the merits of this issue and correct the
error under the auspices of the ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrine.

See Strickland, ABA Standards, supra.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Brooks' convictions and order
a new trial with a voir dire that is adequate to provide a fair and
impartial jury.

This Court should order that upon Mr. Brooks'

retrial, he may not be convicted of and sentenced for both robbery
and burglary.
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APPENDIX 1
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Sec* 7. [Due process of law.]
No person gh«H be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors.
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED
STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing,
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against
any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as
under Section 76-1-601.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
( D A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.

78-46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors.
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if the person is(a) a citizen of the United States;
(b) over the age of 18 years;
(c) a resident of the county; and
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the English language.
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or secondary locations for the
circuit court, a person is not competent to serve as a juror in cases involving
the violation of a municipal ordinance unless the person, in addition to meeting the requirements listed in Subsection (1), resides within the municipality
whose ordinance is alleged to have been violated or, in the case of a municipallty with a population of fewer than 3,000 persons, resides within 15 miles of
the municipality.

78-46-8. Determination on juror qualification — Persons
not competent to serve as jurors.
(1) The court, on its own initiative or when requested by a prospective
juror, shall determine whether the prospective juror is disqualified from jury
service. The court shall base its decision on the information provided on the
juror qualification form, or by interview with the prospective juror or other
competent evidence. The clerk shall enter the court's determination on the
juror qualification form and on the alphabetical list of names drawn from the
master jury wheel.
(2) The following persons are not competent to serve as jurors:
(a) a person who has been convicted of a felony;
(b) a person serving on active duty in the military service of the United
States;
(c) a person who is not capable because of physical or mental disability
of rendering satisfactory jury service. Any person who claims this disqualification may be required to submit a physician's certificate verifying
the disability and the certifying physician is subject to inquiry by the
court at its discretion; or
(d) a person who does not meet the requirements of Section 78-46-7.
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Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary.
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor, and, if
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made,
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him.

Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall
not be used against the alternates.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause.
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken
on one or more of the following grounds:
( D A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a
person competent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party,
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 47

fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to
such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then
a witness therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged,
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such
challenge.
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff,
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list,
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court.
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be
tried with a new jury.
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them
on any subject connected with the trial.
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished
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by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself,
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not,
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves
or any of them, but none taken by any other person.
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause,
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of,
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in
writing or taken down by the reporter.
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed.
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment
for the day.
(q) Declaration of verdict When the jury or three-fourths of them, or
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or
clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the cause.
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury
may be sent out again.
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Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose
names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the
defendant,
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. (1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or
for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection,
drawing, summoning and return of the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is
sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(iv) The court snail decide the challenge. If the challenge to the
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall
direct the selection of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause,
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of
performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted:

(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a
criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge,
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction
regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a
like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before
peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence
and the instructions of the court.

Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary.
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient
that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons
therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him.

Rule 22. Computation and enlargement of time.
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed by
these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of
the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to
run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period
extends until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded
in the computation. As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes days designated as holidays by the state or federal governments.
(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any
act, or may permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time, but the
court may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal or a petition for
review from an order of an administrative agency, except as specifically authorized by law. A motion for an enlargement of time shall be filed prior to the
expiration of the time for which the enlargement is sought. A motion for
enlargement of time shall:
(1) State with particularity the reasons for granting the motion;
(2) State whether the movant has previously been granted an enlargement of time and, if so, the number and duration of such enlargements;
(3) State when the time will expire for doing the act for which the
enlargement of time is sought; and
(4) State the date on which the act for which the enlargement of time is
sought will be completed.
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of time for filing and
service of briefs under Rule 26(a), a party may file one ex parte motion for
enlargement of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has been
previously granted, if the time has not already expired for doing the act for
which the enlargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with
the requirements and limitations of paragraph (b) of this rule.
(d) Additional time after service by mail* Whenever a party is required
or permitted to do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

